In this paper, we discuss the government's reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain network. Considering five game models which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the reverse supply chain network and power structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decisionmaking model with carbon emission constraint; (3) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model; (4) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint; and (5) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint and the government's rewardpenalty mechanism. Building the participation -incentive contract under each model use the principal-agent theory, and solving the model use the Lagrange multiplier method. We can get the following conclusion: (1) when the government implements the reward-penalty mechanism for carbon emission and recycling simultaneously, the recycling rate as well as the buy-back price offered by the manufacturer are higher than those when the government conducts reward-penalty mechanism exclusively for carbon emission; (2) when the government implements carbon emission constraint，both retailers' selling prices of the new product are higher than those when no carbon emission constraint is forced; (3), there is no certain relationship between the two retailers' selling prices of the new product when the government implements the reward-penalty mechanism only for carbon emission and when it implements the mechanism for carbon emission as well as recycling; (4) Regardless of the retailer's fixed cost is high or low, when the government implement reward-penalty mechanism for carbon emission, the retailer's buy-back price is affected by the carbon emission in the manufacturer; (5) When it satisfy certain some conditions, the buy-back price of the retailers' competition reverse supply chain decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint and the government's reward-penalty mechanism can larger than that of the retailers' competition reverse supply chain decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint.
al. (2004) [15] built the incentive function under the rewards and punishment mechanism, under the asymmetric information, they built the coordination mechanism between one manufacturer and one supplier. Heese, Cattani, Ferrer et al.(2005) [16] investigated the impact of the recycling waste electronic product on the advantage of oligarch competition in the double oligarch market. Savaskan et al. (2004) [17] analysed efficiency problem in two different types of reverse supply chain. Guide and Teunter (2003) [18] discussed how to set up the demand equilibrium value of waste electronic products, and it could achieve the benefit maximization in the remanufacturing supply chain system. Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005) [19] researched that there was the positive relationship between the performance of electronic products and the best recovery strategy.
Coordination strategy with symmetric information when the government participating in reverse supply chain.
Above literatures mainly discussed how to realize the coordination strategy with manufacturer or recycler participating in the reverse supply chain. The government as a separate entity, and should be involved in the reverse supply chain activities. It was very important that the government promoted the recovery of the WEEE products by making regulations. For example, the government should take carbon tax to the manufacturer for reducing the carbon emission, while the government could make reward and penalty mechanism so that it could promote the manufacturer to improving the recovery and reuse of the WEEE products. Palmer and Walls (1999) [20] pointed out that the government should provide financial and policy to supporting for manufacturer, and encouraging manufacturer to participate in the waste product recycling and remanufacturing activity. Zhang Bao Yin et al. (2006) [21] pointed out that the government should implement certain reward and punishment measures so that the manufacturer could recycle the old product. Dai Yi Sheng et al. (2008) [24] proposed a new fiscal subsidy mechanism, and required the minimum purchase price in the model. Da Qing Li (2008) [23] pointed out that it worthy to be discussed that the government's policy could impact on recycling the waste product.
Wang Wen Bin et al. (2008) [24] discussed the impact of the reward and penalty mechanism on the manufacturer's recycling activitiy. Mitra et al.(2008) [25] proposed a two-stage game model, and manufacturer or recycler existed competition relationship, analysed the government subsidy impact on the reverse supply chain. Based on above analysis, Wang Wen Bin et al. (2009) [26] compared and analysed the difference that the government provided reward and penalty mechanism to manufacturer and collector. Chen et al. (2009) [27] built an environmental regulation pricing strategy, and they concluded that the government should improve the price standard and it could effectively guide manufacturer to improve the recovery rate of waste product. Based on the government's reward and penalty mechanism, Yan Ming et al. (2015) [28] built the WEEE products remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain model, and analysed the impact of the consumer's pay willingness (WTP) for remanufacturing product and government's reward and penalty mechanism on the pricing, recovery rate and the profit. Ne Jia Jia (2015) [29] analysed the variation of the retailer's recovery price, the profit and the total carbon emission in the case of having carbon emission constraints and having not carbon emission [31] discussed the impact of the government's reward and penalty mechanism on recycling remanufacturing decision.
The above literatures generally considered the government's reward and penalty mechanism and carbon emission as "instrumental variables" in the reverse supply chain. Moreover, the research object in above literatures included one manufacturer and one retailer. The above literatures considered the impact of the government's reward and penalty mechanism on the manufacturer or the retailer under the symmetric information conditions. On the other hand, this paper analysed the impact of the government's reward and penalty mechanism on the reverse supply chain network under the asymmetric information conditions. In the Fig.1 ., we consider a single manufacturer (such as computers), two retailers (such as supermarkets), consumers, and government department supply chain network system components. The manufacturer sells product to two retailers. The retailer one recycles the WEEE products, the recycling rate expresses , and retailer two doesn't recycle the WEEE products. The manufacturer buy-backs the WEEE products from the retailer one, the buyback price expresses 1 w . The manufacturer produces new products by using the old material. 
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. Manufacturer doesn't know retailer one's real information about recycling rate, the fixed cost and the recycling difficulty coefficient, however, the manufacturer knows their distribution probability,
In order to get more profit, the retailer one may provide false information. Under the asymmetric information conditions, the manufacturer should design the identify contract so that the retailer one can make rational choice.
Assuming that the manufacturer is the channel leader of the reverse supply chain network, the retailer is the channel follower. The government should design the reward and penalty mechanism that the government should set the goal recycling rate and the carbon emission superior limitation. On the one hand, when the recycling rate is lower than the goal recovery rate, retailer one should be punished by the government, on the contrary, the retailer one can get reward. On the other hand, when the carbon emission is larger than the superior limitation, retailer one should be punished by the government, on the contrary, the retailer one can get reward. In this paper, under the asymmetric information conditions, the government provides the reward and penalty mechanism for the carbon emission and recovery rate, when two retailers participate in competition activity, discussing how the government should provide reward and penalty mechanism to promoting two retailers participating in the recycling activity.
Variable Descriptions
In this section, we introduce the meaning of some variables. 
The Decision-Making Model of the Reverse Supply Chain Network Based on the
Reward and Penalty Mechanism of the Government under Asymmetric Information
Assuming that the recycling difficulty coefficient, the recycling rate and the fixed cost are the retailer one's private information, it also reflects the asymmetric information between manufacturer and two retailers. The manufacturer should design the identify contract so that the retailer one can make rational choice. The manufacturer design two kinds
. Based on the Principal-agent theory, the manufacturer should set the participation constraint and incentive constraint so that the retailer one can participate in the contract. Five stackelberg game models are built which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the reverse supply chain network and power structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decisionmaking model with carbon emission constraint; (3) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model; (4) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint; and (5) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint and the government's rewardpenalty mechanism. We discuss the government reward and penalty mechanism design problems in the reverse supply chain network with asymmetric information and retail-level Competition in the presence of carbon emission constraints.
ModelⅠ: The reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model
Firstly, we research the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model. In this case, in order to identify the true cost of the retailer one, we must use the above contract. In order to comparing with the decentralized decision-making model, assuming that there are one manufacturer and one retailer in the modelⅠ.
The profit of the manufacturer can be expressed as follows:
The profit of the retailer one can be expressed as follows:
The total profit of the reverse supply chain network is that:
The participation constraint and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that: 
In equation (4), 0 R  is the lowest profit of the retailer one, the first two inequalities are the participation constraint, the after two inequalities are the incentive constraint.
The modelⅠcan be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as follows: 
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ModelⅡ: The reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint
In this case, the government total degree of reward and penalty mechanism for the manufacturer is
, in this model, the decision-maker pursue the overall profit maximization. Assuming that there are one manufacturer and one retailer in the modelⅡ, the profit of the manufacturer can be expressed as follows: 
The total profit of the reverse supply chain is that:
In equation (12), 0 R  is the lowest profit of the retailer one, the first two inequalities is the participation constraint, the after two inequalities is the incentive constraint. 
Model Ⅲ: the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model
In this case, the manufacturer is the channel leader in the Stackelberg game model, while, two retailers are the follower in the Stackelberg game model. The manufacturer commissioned the retailer one recycling the WEEE products. At the same time, there is competition relationship between two retailers. In model Ⅲ, the manufacturer and two retailers should consider their own maximize profit. The profit of the manufacturer can be expressed as follows:
The participation and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that: 0   2  3  3  3  1  2  1  2  1   2  3  3  3  1  2  1  2  1   2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  1  2  1  2  1  1  2  1  2  1   2  3  3  3 
The retailer one is responsible for recycling the WEEE product, the decision variables are and 1 p , the retailer one's profit can be expressed as follows:
The retailer two is not responsible for recycling the WEEE product, the decision variable is 2 p , the retailer two's profit can be expressed as follows:
The decision order for the game model Ⅲ: Firstly, the manufacturer should decide the buy-back price   The model Ⅲ can be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as follows: 
The participation and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that: 
The retailer one's profit can be expressed as follows:
The retailer two's profit can be expressed as follows:
The model Ⅳ can be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as follows:
The model Ⅴcan be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as follows: 
Comparing the result in different decision-making game models
In this section, we mainly compare the result in different decision-making game models; we can get the following propositions: Proposition 1. Comparing the modelⅠwith the modelⅡ: If
Proposition 1 suggests that the retailer one's fixed cost is higher, if
, in other words, when the manufacturer's carbon emission is smaller than the total degree of the reward and penalty strength, the buy-back price in the model Ⅱ is larger than that in the model Ⅰ .On the contrary, if
, in other words, when the manufacturer's carbon emission is larger than the total degree of the reward and penalty strength, the buy-back price in the modelⅡis smaller than that in the modelⅠ.
The retailer one's fixed cost is lower, the buy-back price in the modelⅡis lower than that in the modelⅠ.
Proposition 2 .
Comparing the modelⅠwith the modelⅡ:
Proposition 2 suggests that no matter how high or low of the fixed cost in the retailer one, the recycling rate in the modelⅡis smaller than that in the modelⅠ. 
the buy-back price in the model Ⅳis larger than that in the model Ⅲ. On the contrary, if it satisfy the following 
, the buy-back price in the modelⅤis larger than that in the model Ⅳ. We can get the following conclusions: 
Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the government's reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain network. Considering five game models which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the reverse supply chain network and power structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint; (3) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model; (4) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decisionmaking model with carbon emission constraint; (5) the retailers' competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint and the government's reward-penalty mechanism. Building the participation-incentive contract under each model use the principal-agent theory and solving the model use the Lagrange multiplier method. We can get the following conclusion: (1) when the government implements the reward-penalty mechanism for carbon emission and recycling simultaneously, the recycling rate as well as the buy-back price offered by the manufacturer are higher than those when the government conducts reward-penalty mechanism exclusively for carbon emission; (2) when the government implements carbon emission constraint，both retailers' selling prices of the new product are higher than those when no carbon emission constraint is forced; (3) there is no certain relationship between the two retailers' selling prices of the new product when the government implements the reward-penalty mechanism only for carbon emission and when it implements the mechanism for carbon emission as well as recycling; (4) Regardless of the retailer's fixed cost is high or low, when the government implement reward-penalty mechanism for carbon emission, the retailer's buy-back price is affected by the carbon emission in the manufacturer; (5) When it satisfy certain some conditions, the buy-back price of the retailers' competition reverse supply chain decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint and the government's reward-penalty mechanism can larger than that of the retailers' competition reverse supply chain decentralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint.
In this paper, we discuss the government's reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain network. However, dual asymmetric information can't be considered in this paper. In the future, we should consider the government's reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of dual asymmetric information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain network. Moreover, we can discuss the government's reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information and carbon emission constraint when the manufacturers compete in reverse supply chain network.
